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Irrigation and collective action: A study in method
with reference to the Shiwalik Hills, Haryana
Mathew Kurian and Ton Dietz
Abstract
In recent years decentralized development approaches have gained prominence in the agricultural sector. A host of commun-
ity based watershed management projects have been implemented that encourage community organizations to undertake
management of previously government controlled irrigation systems and forests. Community organizations have been given
the responsibility of managing water distribution, collection of irrigation service fees and undertaking routine maintenance
of irrigation infrastructure. In this context, analysis of irrigation management has concluded that groups that are relatively
homogeneous may fare better than heterogeneous groups in facilitating collective action. However, this article argues that
analysis of the influence of group heterogeneity on collective action is complicated because of its multi-dimensional nature
and the presence on non-monotonic effects in mechanisms linking heterogeneity and collective outcomes. The article
discusses the importance of context specification in analysis of group heterogeneity through a discussion of elements of a
joint management contract in Haryana (India), identification of key variables with a potential to explain collective action in
irrigation management and construction of household endowment and water interest scores to account for the influence of
group heterogeneity in facilitating collective action. In the process of applying household endowment and water interest
scores, the authors highlight the role of local ecological variation and non-farm employment in influencing collective action.
Proper specification of local context enables the researchers to rely on household endowment and water interest scores to
predict conflicts and potential for irrigation service provision and compliance with irrigation service rules.
Keywords: Irrigation; Collective action; Research method; Watershed management; India.
tenance of irrigation infrastructure such as water harvesting
dams (ADB, 2001).
Studies have pointed out that farmers’ groups that are
internally differentiated on the basis of income or resources
may not be so successful at collective action when compared
to groups that are relatively more homogeneous (Chambers
et al., 1992; Bandopadyay and Eschen, 1988). This may
especially be the case in the context of management of
common pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation canals,
fisheries or forests that are characterized by features like
non-excludability and subtractibility in use (Ostrom, 1990).
For instance, a study of 10 irrigation reservoirs in India
found that the smaller the variance in farm size among far-
mers, the more farmers were likely to form water user asso-
ciations (Easter and Palanisami, 1986). Lam (1994) reveals
a negative relationship between inequality in landholding
and irrigation systems performance. Another study reveals
a negative relationship between variance in average family
income among irrigators and degree of rule conformance
and maintenance activity (Tang, 1992).
In addition to endowments, collective action may also
be influenced by distribution of interests within commun-
1. Introduction
In recent years decentralized development approaches
have gained wide acceptance in policy circles. In the agri-
culture sector in particular, farmer-managed irrigation and
community-based forest management projects have been
promoted with a view to facilitating integrated management
of natural resources in a watershed context. Community-
based watershed management projects typically encour-
age participation of rural communities in management of
previously publicly controlled forests or irrigation sys-
tems (IWMI, 1995: 4). Donor-supported community-based
watershed management projects in particular have em-
phasized the need for collective action by stakeholders to
undertake tasks of catchment protection, water distribution,
collection of irrigation service fees (ISFs) and routine main-
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ity groups. Schlager’s case study (1990) on fisheries, for
example, underlines the importance of a stable economic
environment and moderate to high returns for fishermen in
sustaining collective action. Other case studies highlight
the role of technology and expansion of markets in creating
divergent interests among fishermen that lead to a break-
down in collective action. Studies also emphasize the role
of heterogeneous distribution of skills and ethnicity in influ-
encing collective action. Wade’s case study (1988) of tank
management in South India notes the influence of scatter-
ing of plots of arable land in sustaining interest by large
and small landholders in collective action. However, it must
be pointed out that Kanbur’s review of case studies focuses
primarily on distribution of interests. Examination of dis-
tribution of interests and its relationship with distribution
of endowments is missing in his analysis. But as Baland
and Platteau (1996) point out, analysis of resources and
interests should not be carried out in isolation, because,
‘groups that are heterogeneous may be able to devise insti-
tutions that enable them to draw on complementarities (like
homogeneous economic interests) to build a stronger foun-
dation for collective action’ (Poteete and Ostrom, 2003:
15–16).1
This article is an attempt to discuss the process by
which costs and benefits of earthen dam2 management in
the Haryana Shiwaliks are distributed within farmer’s
groups. From a methodological point of view we raise two
questions:
• What variables may be used to define distribution of
interests and resources, and how can they be justified?
• What are the local-level processes by which distribution
of endowments and resources combine to influence col-
lective action in management of common pool resources?
The remaining sections of the article describe the key
features of the Sukhomajiri watershed project in Haryana
State of India and the process by which it was scaled out
(replicated) in the Shiwalik Hills of Haryana. Issues of
transparency and accountability are discussed in the con-
text of the discussion on the functioning of earthen dams in
the post-project phase. The article also analyses the role of
historically-defined power and social exchange relations,
accumulation strategies of farmers and differentiation in
access to natural resources.
2. Analyzing collective action in irrigation:
grounding concepts in an empirical context
2.1. The Sukhomajiri watershed model. Key features of a
joint management contract
Panchkula district has the largest proportion of land under
forests in Haryana. As a result, the district has been a par-
ticularly important focus of participatory forestry projects.
Since the early 1980s a spate of community forestry initi-
atives have been undertaken: social forestry; joint forest
management; and the Haryana community forestry project.
The Haryana Joint Forest Management (JFM) Project was
responsible for developing an integrated model of water-
shed management based on experiments that were under-
taken in the village of Sukhomajiri between 1975 and 1985
(Arya and Samra, 1995). From the point of view of the
Haryana Forest Department (HFD), the Sukhomajiri water-
shed management intervention was crucial to reduce siltation
of the Sukhna Reservoir, located further downstream in the
state capital of Chandigarh. The Sukhomajiri model was
premised on the idea that a linear relationship exists between
the condition of forests located in the Shiwalik Hills and
agricultural productivity in low lying plains (see Figure 1).
As a result fodder production on private fields was encour-
aged through provision of irrigation from earthen dams in
the expectation that greater fodder and dung3 production
from irrigated fields would obviate the need to use State
owned forests for fodder and fuelwood extraction. Between
1984 and 1989 an attempt was made to scale out or replic-
ate the Sukhomajiri watershed model to about 35 micro-
watersheds located in Morni-Pinjore Forest Division4 of
Panchkula District in Haryana. An important feature of the
scaling-out phase of the project was the creation of institu-
tional mechanisms for sharing revenue from state forests
with local communities. Five features of the institutional
contract that characterized joint management of watershed
resources are worth highlighting (TERI, 1998):
• Water user associations were constituted as hill resource
management societies (HRMS) under the Registration of
Societies Act of 1900.
1 Such a perspective may, for example, partly explain how water user
associations and individual water contractors have begun to systematic-
ally replace traditional forms of village-leader controlled water organiza-
tions in China’s Yellow River Basin (see Wang et al., 2002).
2 Earthen dams are made of compacted soil from the Shiwalik foothills.
Shiwalik Hills forests serve as catchment of earthen dams. The catchment
areas are usually bowl shaped; water from the hills collects in them during
the monsoon period, and is used during the winter period for supplement-
ary irrigation, primarily for wheat cultivation. Institutional arrangements
that regulate opening and closing the sluice valves are critical; if the
sluice valve is left open beyond a certain point the dead storage of the
dam silts up. Water is transported to agricultural fields on the basis of
gravity flow. The dams are also fitted with spillways to ensure that excess
water flows away without damaging the main body of the dam.
3 Cattle dung is used extensively as a cooking fuel in the Shiwalik region.
It was assumed that increased production of cattle dung would reduce
pressure on state forests for supply of fuelwood for cooking purposes. An
alternative approach to reducing pressure on forests for fuelwood collection
has been to facilitate greater adoption of non biomass fuels like liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) technology for cooking purposes by rural popula-
tions. This strategy has been attempted at an all India scale by the Indian
Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (see Ramana, 1996).
4 For administrative purposes Morni-Pinjore Forest Division is further
subdivided into three forest ranges: Pinjore, Panchkula and Raipur Rani.
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Figure 1. The Sukhomajiri watershed model.
5 It is important to note that a one-to-one correspondence between HRMS
and dams does not exist. This is because some HRMS like Sukhomajiri
had more than one dam under their management. Further, some dams
were constructed in areas where no HRMS existed or HRMS were consti-
tuted where no dams were constructed.
• Landless households were given a share of water from
dams provided they were members of the HRMS.
Attempts were made to institute a system of tradable
water shares so that landless households could sell their
share of water to other households.
• An important principle regarding use of HRMS funds
was that a proportion of profits from the sale of water
from dams (and fibre and fodder grasses) could be used
for community development activities. Such activities
could take the form of construction of village roads,
repair of school buildings or construction of rest areas
for labourers.
• At least a third of positions in the managing committee
of the HRMS are to be reserved for women. Every woman
in a household was entitled to membership distinct from
membership of the male head of household in the gen-
eral body of HRMS.
• The Haryana Forest Department (HFD) facilitates parti-
cipation of community groups in watershed management
by organizing annual elections of managing commit-
tees of HRMS and monitoring annual auctions of fibre
grass and water harvesting rights to forests under joint
management.
2.2. Rapid survey of HRMS
As noted earlier, 35 of the HRMS were established in
the Morni-Pinjore Forest Division of Haryana under the
watershed management project. The study focuses on the
Morni-Pinjore division of Panchkula District for two rea-
sons: (i) the watershed management project was initially
started in the area; and (ii) external intervention in the form
of NGO visits was minimal between 1996 and 2000. Due
to logistics difficulties, such as impassable roads during
the monsoon rains, this study could cover only 28 HRMS
responsible for managing 45 earthen dams.5 Our survey of
the 28 HRMS in the Morni-Pinjore Forest Division was
undertaken over a period of one month in which informa-
tion was collected on variables such as group composition,
access to alternative irrigation sources and participation in
management of earthen dams. The highlights of the survey
included (Kurian, 2003):
• Human populations in Shiwalik villages rely on forest
areas to meet a substantial part of their subsistence needs
for fuelwood and livestock fodder from forest areas.
• Agriculture is the predominant occupation of Shiwalik
villages. However, in villages located near towns and
cities, non-agricultural employment usually takes the
form of engagement in house construction activity and
gatekeepers in factories. Closer to village settlements,
employment in stone quarrying and soil and water con-
servation activities sponsored by the Forest Department
is available. Such employment is however, low paying
and unpredictable.
• Access to irrigation offers potential to double agricul-
tural yields of wheat during the winter period. Irrigation
from earthen dams typically benefits up to 35 households
in a micro-watershed. Water distribution is by hourly
rotation starting with head-end water users and ending
with those with plots at the tail end of an irrigation sys-
tem. Water user fees are charged by the hour, ranging
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Table 1. Post-project analysis of earthen dams in Morni-Pinjore Forest Division
Indicator Dams for Pinjore Dams for Panchkula Dams for Raipur Rani Dams for
entire Forest forest range range forest range range forest range range
Division (1975–83) (1984–89) (1990–98)
Number of dams silted within 5 years (45) (18) (14) (14)
of construction 31.3% 4 22.2% 7 50% 3 21.4%
Number of dams silted within 10 years
of construction 33.3% 5 27.7% 3 21.4% 7 50%
Number of dams functioning for less than 1 year 20% 6 33.3% 1 7.1% 1 7.1%
Number of dams functioning in 2000 17.7% 4 22.2% 2 14.2% 2 14.2%
Table 2. Profile of HRMS groups by mode of water provisioning from earthen damsa
HRMS Land Agriculture Private Caste Evidence of Mode of Land area Number of Percentage of
ownership is primary alternatives to composition collective provision irrigated beneficiaries Water Users
pattern source of earthen dam action to from by dam of irrigation Complying
(proxy for incomeb (proxy exist (proxy manage earthen dams (ha) from damc with Irrigation
endowments) for interest) for interest) earthen dams Service Fees
Sukhomajiri Even Yes Yes Single No HRMS 24 12 None
Dhamala Skewed No No Multi Yes Contractor 16 30 100%
Lohgarh Skewed No No Multi Yes Contractor 18 15 100%
Nada Skewed No No Multi Yes Contractor 12 60 None
Bharauli Skewed No No Multi Yes Contractor 16 35 42.1%
Thadion Even Yes Yes Single No HRMS 15 15 100%
Govindpur Even No No Single Yes Contractor 24 23 None
Mandpa
Kiratpur Skewed Yes Yes Multi No HRMS 6 15 100%
Notes:
a Where more than one dam was functioning in a HRMS, we focused on the dam which the larger number of households relied on for water. We also
overlooked dams that were choked but which households continued to use using a siphoning system.
b More than 50% of water users do not rely on agriculture as primary source of income.
c Average number of beneficiaries of earthen dams.
6 Collective action was evident in relatively higher levels of compliance
with water distribution rules, expenditure on repairs and labour contribu-
tions towards maintenance of dams. The criteria we used to evaluate
compliance with water use rules were as follows: number of water users
as a percentage of total complying with irrigation service fees. Later on in
this paper we provide an elaborate justification for choice of variables in
analyzing collective action in irrigation management.
based provision. Under this system, an individual leases
out water distribution rights at an annual auction organized
by the HRMS. The contractor is then held accountable for
water distribution, collection of irrigation service fees and
undertaking routine maintenance.
An examination of the socio-economic profile of HRMS
reveals some interesting facts relating to collective action
(Table 2). For instance, we find that of the eight groups
with functioning dams, five showed evidence of collective
action.6 Of these five groups, four were heterogeneous in
caste composition and one was homogeneous. Further, of
the four heterogeneous groups, all had adopted a system
of contractor-based water provisioning. In the case of the
homogeneous group as well (Govindpur Mandpa), a con-
tractor had assumed responsibility for water provisioning.
from Rs 10 to Rs 25 per hour. Depending on the composi-
tion of the village, there are usually multiple caste groups
benefiting from irrigation from earthen dams.
• Only eight earthen dams of a total of 45 that were con-
structed in Morni-Pinjore Forest Division were function-
ing when data for this study were collected in June, 2000
(Kurian, 2003). The eight functioning dams were under
the management of eight HRMS. A large number of dams
had silted up or had been washed away much before
their expected ‘shelf life’ of about 10–15 years had been
attained. This failure was because of a number of tech-
nical problems relating to location of head works and
quality of construction. Table 1 provides information on
the number of functioning dams in the Forest Division.
2.3. Collective action in earthen dam management: the
embedded nature of irrigation institutions
Our review of eight HRMS with functioning dams revealed
two systems of water provisioning. The first system is that
of the HRMS being involved in framing water distribution
rules, collection of irrigation service fees and undertaking
of routine maintenance. The second system is contractor-
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It is also interesting to note that of the three groups that
showed little or no evidence of collective action, two were
homogeneous and one was heterogeneous. In the case of the
two homogeneous groups, the HRMS was responsible for
water provisioning. In the heterogeneous group (Kiratpur)
too the HRMS was responsible for water provisioning.
Therefore, it is possible to notice a pattern between group
composition, type of water provisioning and evidence of
collective action.7 Groups that are heterogeneous facilitated
water distribution by a private contractor, the result being
that compliance with collective action rules tended to be
greater. On the contrary, groups that are relatively homo-
geneous relied on HRMS provisioning and consequently
failed to ensure compliance with collective action rules.
However, two groups in our sample appear as exceptions
to the general rule: Govindpur Mandpa, despite being homo-
geneous, has resorted to a private contractor and succeeded
in collective action. Kiratpur, despite being heterogeneous,
has relied on HRMS provisioning and failed to provide
evidence of collective action.
Each of these cases offers lessons on the importance of
group composition in analysing collective action. First, the
Govindpur Mandpa case highlights a methodological issue.
The fact that a contractor has emerged to provide irrigation
services in Govindpur Mandpa despite it being a homo-
geneous group suggests that choice of variables is critical
in determining levels of homogeneity or heterogeneity. Pre-
vious studies of influence of group heterogeneity in CPR
management have tended to rely on static analysis based
on variables like land ownership or caste composition (see
Baker, 1998; Bardhan, 2000). But we argue that an approach
that combines analysis of process variables (such as land
area irrigated or rainfed, livestock composition, or house-
hold size) with analysis of socio-economic processes that
reflect changes over time in process variables may better
explain the underlying conditions of collective action. Socio-
economic processes may include historically defined power
and social exchange relations, accumulation strategies of
farmer households or differentiation8 in terms of access to
natural resources such as land and water.
Second, the Kiratpur case highlights the importance of
factoring in ecological variation and non-farm employment
in understanding the role of interests in shaping collective
action. We note that Kiratpur, despite being a heterogene-
ous group, has relied on HRMS water provisioning. This is
primarily due to two reasons. One is that less than half of
water users in Kiratpur rely on agriculture as their primary
source of income. This reflects their involvement in non-
farm labour markets, which could imply that landholders
spend considerable time away from the settlement and are
therefore in no position to monitor water use rules, should
they decide to serve as water contractor. The second reason
is that farmers interest in using water from earthen dams
is not as intense as it would be in the absence of private
alternatives. Most farmers using water from the earthen
dam also have access to a private tubewell. In the ensuing
discussion we will highlight the role of groundwater depth
(a critical feature of local ecology in the Haryana Shiwaliks)
and its effects on cost of tubewell adoption with a view to
highlight its influence on collective action in irrigation
management.9
2.4. Case study approach
We used five criteria to arrive at the choice of Bharauli and
Thadion HRMS for a detailed case study: (i) water harvest-
ing dams must be operational; (ii) HRMS must be func-
tional; (iii) one HRMS must be relatively heterogeneous
and show evidence of collective action in comparison to
another that is relatively homogeneous and fails to show
evidence of collective action with regard to dam manage-
ment; (iv) HRMS must be situated in close proximity to
each other to reduce differences in contextual factors like
distance from markets, slope, elevation and forest type; (v)
HMRS must be situated in Raipur Rani forest range, where
rural livelihoods depend to a greater extent on agriculture
and animal husbandry.
2.5. Overview of case study sites
2.5.1. Group size, ethnic composition and forest area
Bharauli is a relatively large village with 80 households,
compared to Thadion with its 50 households (see Figure 2).
Bharauli has a population of 476, compared to 318 in
Thadion. Bharauli is a multi-caste community that includes:
gujjars, tarkhans, rajputs and harijans. By contrast, Thadion
is homogeneous with respect to caste with only gujjar
households.
7 This relationship still needs to be statistically tested using a larger number
of cases. This study by using case study evidence attempts to clarify a
relationship between provision, group composition and rule compliance in
natural resource management. We hope such an analysis would provide
sufficient basis for future studies that attempt to statistically examine this
relationship using a larger data set.
8 White (1989) describes a process of differentiation as involving emer-
gence or sharpening of differences within the rural population, but it does
not in itself consist of (and in some cases, at least in the short term, may
not involve) increasing income inequalities. It is not about whether some
farmers are becoming richer than others but about the changing kinds of
relations between them in the context of development of commodity rela-
tions in the rural economy.
9 Analysis of influence of group heterogeneity on collective action is
complicated because (a) it is multi-dimensional and (b) the mechanisms
linking heterogeneity and collective outcomes are recursive and non-
monotonic. Heterogeneity is multi-dimensional because it includes wealth
inequality and heterogeneity of interests (see Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan,
2002). Bardhan and others examine the multi-dimensional nature of influ-
ence of group heterogeneity on collective action by employing a multi-
variate analytical framework. There have also been attempts to test the
non-monotonic effect of heterogeneity (i.e. inequality might harm collective
action, but beyond a certain level, increasing inequality might enhance
collective action) (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002).
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Figure 2. Watershed areas of HRMS Bharauli and Thadion
Shiwalik forests serve as their catchment. The catchment
area of the dam at Bharauli is 39 ha, while the area of the
dam at Thadion is 15 ha. Further, the command area of the
dam at Bharauli is 40 ha compared to 20 ha at Thadion.
Thirty-five households benefit from irrigation from the
dam in Bharauli while fifteen households benefit from
dam-assisted irrigation in Thadion.
2.5.4. Water use rules
Water in earthen dams is harvested during the kharif (rainy,
monsoon) season (June to September). Harvested water is
then used during the rabi (dry) season (winter) primarily
for the wheat crop. Tariff rates for irrigation water from the
dam are fixed in consultation with water users who associate
a higher charge with greater assurance of predictable water
supplies. Three to four rounds of watering are possible in
both Bharauli and Thadion. Rules stipulate that water dis-
tribution should take place on a rotational (hourly) basis
for the wheat crop. During each round farmers whose lands
are situated closer to the dam are supplied water first, after
which water is released for use by farmers farther down the
distribution channel.10
2.5.5. Water transport
Water is transported by plastic pipe from earthen dams. The
pipes are buried about three feet in the ground. At strategic
locations in the command area, vertical exit valves are
placed. At the ends of the plastic pipeline, farmers dig arti-
ficial water courses to transport water to their fields. Water
transport is dependent on gravity flow and usually has to
crisscross several fields. As a result, water transport in some
cases involves negotiations between farmers to facilitate
the digging of channels to divert water towards their fields.
2.5.6. Alternative irrigation on dam-irrigated land
In Bharauli, households have access to kuhls11 for land that
is irrigated by the dam. But the kuhls run dry by early
10 A system of tradable water shares was introduced by the JFM project,
whereby landless households in particular who did not have a need for
irrigation water could sell their share of water to other households. But
our study indicates that the system of water-tradable shares was not being
implemented in Bharauli.
11 Each family or gotra is allocated water from the kuhl by rotation for a
12-hour period. One water user is given the responsibility of monitoring
the rotation. For his services he allocated six hours of water from the kuhl
in excess of his designated share of 20 minutes of water. The number of
hours a household receives water is determined by the size of land hold-
ing. For example, in the Poswal family there are seven households with a
total water availability of 12 hours per rotation. One among the seven
households with land size of 20 acres is allocated six hours of water while
the remaining six households with land size of three acres each are allo-
cated water for one hour only. In case of subdivided land within a house-
hold the number of hours of water distribution is likewise reduced. The
water users of Bharauli meet twice annually to decide on minor repairs to
be undertaken to the kuhl. Although the management of the kuhl bears no
connection to the HRMS organization that has been established by the
state for management of the earthen dam in Bharauli, a number of benefi-
ciaries of the kuhl also receive irrigation from the dam.
2.5.2. Caste basis for occupational specialization and
social segregation
Given the greater diversity of castes in Bharauli, some oc-
cupational specialization based on caste identity is evident.
For instance, the tarkhans or blacksmiths undertake work
for other caste groups. In return for their services, they are
usually paid in grain. Only two tarkhan households own
arable land and they avoid rearing livestock. Likewise, the
harijans have traditionally worked as hired labour on other
people’s fields or as domestic helpers in the homes of large
landholders. The rajput caste households in the village form
a distinct group because they have monopolized the petty
transport business. Caste-based notions of impurity and
hierarchy in Bharauli prevent harijans from using drinking
water taps, ponds and temples frequented by members of
other castes. Caste also influences separate residential loca-
tions for different caste groups within the village. Harijans
when invited to marriages in the village are usually expected
to sit at a distance from others and use separate utensils.
No such caste-based pattern of occupational specialization
or social segregration exists in Thadion.
2.5.3. Earthen dams
There are two earthen dams in the study area, each con-
structed by the state forest department. In both cases the
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February and, if rains do not arrive by early March, the
supply of the last round of supplemental irrigation for wheat
depends on water from the earthen dam. If the rains fail
altogether (in the period from November to March), reliance
on water from the dam becomes even more critical. The
higher drilling costs associated with groundwater exploita-
tion in Bharauli had limited access to private tubewells. In
Thadion by contrast groundwater can be tapped at higher
reaches, thereby lowering drilling costs. As a result a relat-
ively larger number of dam water users have access to
private tubewells for irrigation.
3. Construction and application of nature-based
household endowment and water interest scores
3.1. Nature based household endowment scores
From our discussion in the previous section it becomes
clear that crop agriculture and animal husbandry are im-
portant sources of rural livelihoods in the Morni-Pinjore
Forest Division in Haryana. Non-farm employment as
casual labour in stone quarrying and house construction
activities are important in that they supplement income
from agriculture-based activity. This is particularly the case
with land-owning households. Landless households derive
a significant part of their income from non-farm sources.
But considering that landless households do not con-
stitute more than 15% to 25% of households in Shiwalik
villages, we can safely assume that most households
derive their livelihoods from farm-based activity (TERI,
1998). Thus, we chose to construct nature-based house-
hold endowment scores based on agriculture and animal
husbandry.
In the process of constructing household endowment
scores we considered four variables: (i) total rainfed land
owned; (ii) total irrigated land owned; (iii) type of livestock
owned; and (iv) size of household. In constructing house-
hold endowment scores we devised weights for each of
the assets outlined above. The weights were decided based
on food productivity assessments undertaken in Shiwalik
villages (Appendix 1). In devising weights for caloric value
of cereal crops and average milk production, we made cer-
tain assumptions that are outlined in Appendix 1. Based
on average food productivity assessments for cereal crops
and milk, we calculated household endowment scores for
households.12
3.2. Construction of household water interest scores
To examine patterns of farmer interest in earthen dams,
we constructed interest scores13 for water-using households
in Bharauli and Thadion HRMS. In calculating interest
scores for farmer households, we made some assumptions
based on preliminary data analysis and discussions with
key informants. First, we assumed that the larger the area
irrigated by the earthen dam, the greater the interest in its
use; conversely, the smaller the area the lower the interest.
Second, the greater the reliability14 afforded by alternative
sources of irrigation for dam-irrigated land, the smaller
farmers potential interest would be in participating in man-
agement activities like repair and maintenance of the earthen
dam. This relates to our third assumption: the greater the area
under irrigation outside the dam command area, the lower
the potential interest would be in participating in collective
action (e.g. purchasing water distribution rights, complying
with water user charges, water distribution rules).
Interest scores of 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 were decided based on
findings of household food productivity assessments. We
noted that access to irrigation could increase wheat produc-
tion per acre by a factor of two. Likewise, irrigation could
increase the number of people who can be fed from one
acre of land by a factor of two. In determining weights for
(i) area irrigated by dam, (ii) alternative sources of irriga-
tion for dam-irrigated land and (iii) land area outside dam
command area, therefore, we allocated weights that differed
by a factor of two.
3.3. Applying nature-based household endowment and
water interest scores — empirical observations
3.3.1. Non-farm income and interest in earthen dam
management
Non-farm income is becoming an important source of sup-
plementary household income. However, although this study
collected information on non-farm income we did not use
it in our calculation of household endowment and water
interest scores for three reasons. First, with the exception
of a couple of households in Bharauli and Thadion non-
farm employment was limited to about four to five months,
mostly during the dry season. It is irrelevant to ask whether
non-farm income earned during this period had the poten-
tial to adversely impact on collective action in dam man-
agement. Second, the majority of non-farm jobs were low
12 One weakness of the household endowment score which we acknow-
ledge is the assumption that adults and children have the same activity
levels and similar calorie requirements. Theoretically household endow-
ment scores could also incorporate supply of calories from consumption
of produce from home gardens and non-timber forest products like wild
berries and honey from forest areas. In the Haryana Shiwaliks though, we
find supply of calories from such sources to be insignificant.
13 Recent research has pointed to the importance of rigorous appraisal
methods to enhance the quality of project selection and the financial viabil-
ity of donor-supported interventions (see Walle and Gunawardene, 2001).
As a result, multilateral development banks have begun to experiment with
the use of qualitative codes and weights to predict farmer participation in
management of common pool resources and project monitoring (see Dayal
et al., 2000; Pincus, 1996).
14 By reliability we refer to the number of months irrigation is forthcom-
ing from different sources. Tubewells provide water all year round and
Tal kuhl/Nadi river for eight months between July and early February.
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paying — enough only to sustain non-food purchases of
consumptive value (like bathing soap or toothpaste) dur-
ing the dry months. Thirdly, cultivation of family-owned
plots under dam-assisted irrigation actually facilitated build-
ing up a food stock of wheat that enabled male members to
go out in search of non-farm jobs during the dry season.15
Therefore, contrary to what one may assume, non-farm
employment may diminish the potential for collective action
in irrigation management; cultivation of farm plots under
dam-assisted irrigation was actually sustaining engagement
in non-farm labour markets during the critical dry season
period.
Another shortcoming of relying too heavily on non-
farm income data arises from the often-stated criticism of
use of income data in poverty analysis. This is because of
the tendency of household income data to vary across sea-
sons: pre-sowing to post-harvest and summer to monsoon,
depending on when the inquiry is conducted (Ravallion,
1992). As Sen (1999: 81) points out, ‘In any choice of
criteria for evaluative purposes, there would not only be
use of value judgments, but also, quite often, use of judg-
ments on which full agreement would not exist. But the real
issue is whether we can use some criteria that would have
greater public support, for evaluative purposes, than the
crude indicators often recommended, such as real-income
measures.’
To overcome this criticism, we chose to use nature-based
household endowment scores. Household endowment scores
implicitly acknowledge that access to irrigation can boost
per acre productivity of cereal crops. We clarify our point
with an example from Bharauli HRMS. A household with
four family members, 0.2 acres of non-irrigated land and
ownership of one adult cow had an endowment score of 2.4
and a food production capacity of 60% (i.e., 2.4/4 = 0.6).
The household had a food deficit of 40%, but it also had
access to non-farm income of Rs 19,200 per year. With
wheat costing Rs 7.00/kg, this household could purchase a
total of 2,743 kgs of wheat using its non-farm income.
Access to irrigation can prove critical in determining the
extent of household interest in complying with rules relat-
ing to management of earthen dams. Household interest
scores by considering ‘irrigated land area’ as an important
variable in the analysis captures this dimension of house-
hold survival strategy.
What constitutes collective action? Collective action may
take two distinct forms: provision of collective goods by
an individual entrepreneur; and concerted action by a group
of resource users to comply with rules regulating use of a
common pool system. From the point of view of irrigation
management in the Haryana Shiwliks, we observed four
types of collective action: (i) compliance with water distri-
bution rules; (ii) compliance with payment of fees for water
use and lease payment by contractors (where applicable);
(iii) compliance with rules that stipulated contribution of
money or labour to undertake routine maintenance of the
dam; and (iv) negotiation and sanction over contractors ap-
pointment, setting of water fee rates and mode of payment.
Measurement challenges presented themselves in our
attempt to categorize HRMS depending on their levels of
collective action. For example, it was difficult to arrive at a
standard measure of what constitutes high level of compli-
ance with water distribution rules. Instead level of compli-
ance with water distribution rules were more observable
using conflict as a proxy variable. Here again it was import-
ant to distinguish between conflicts that were related to
routine working of the irrigation system (like minor delays
in releasing water to neighbouring fields) and those that
had the potential to disrupt the functioning of the system
(like systematic pilferage during the night). These were
issues that could be captured using a locally focused case-
study approach.
The difficulty with arriving at a standard measure of
comparative value also arose in relation to compliance with
routine maintenance activity. Here we found that contribu-
tions towards maintenance were bound to vary depending
on factors such as size of the dam, quality of dam construc-
tion and state investment in repairs. For example, we noticed
in the case of Lohgarh and Dhamala HRMS, relatively
high state investment in dam maintenance had ‘crowded
out’ community contributions towards repairs. Does that
mean that these groups had low potential for collective
action? Empirical studies of these two groups suggest the
contrary (see Sarin, 1996). Therefore, controlling for dif-
ferences in these factors was important to understand the
motivations behind community participation in maintenance
activity.
One measure which made it possible to arrive at a cat-
egorization of HRMS depending on levels of collective
action relates to compliance with irrigation service fees.
Here we notice operation of the ‘all or nothing’ phenomenon.
People complied with fee payments if they were convinced
that others were paying up as well. If some did not pay
fees on time, no one in the group paid. Similarly, in cases
where water users did not comply with payment schedules,
contractors were reluctant to engage in providing services
for fear of forfeiting their lease deposit with the HRMS.
Levels of compliance with irrigation service fees also had an
effect on other parameters of collective action. For example,
when fee compliance was low, it was not uncommon to
observe conflicts that prevented orderly water distribution.
Moreover, contributions of labour and money towards rou-
tine maintenance activity also tended to be low. This was
because users perceived high discount rates associated with
collective action and their conclusion that norms of fair
distribution were not in operation (see Ostrom, 1990). There-
fore, we chose the parameter of level of compliance with
irrigation service fees to categorize HRMS depending on
their levels of collective action.
15 Although paddy is cultivated in the area, it is not consumed locally, but
is reserved exclusively for sale. Wheat and maize serve as the staple diet
of local populations.
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4.2. Distribution of interest and conflicts over water use
The limited access to private sources of irrigation (tubewells)
in Bharauli has meant that dependence on common pool
resources (dams) is critical for the supply of supplemental
irrigation during the rabi (dry) season.17 This is reflected in
a relatively high mean level of interest in earthen dams in
Bharauli. A high level of interest is also reflected in data
relating to share of income from irrigated agriculture, crop-
ping intensity rate and area irrigated by dam for households
drawn from different endowment categories (Table 4). In
Thadion, by contrast, we found a lower mean level of inter-
est in use of the earthen dam. This is primarily because half
the water users have access to tubewells. The same group
of water users with access to tubewells also has their
farm plots located at the head of the command area of the
earthen dam. Further, most of the households with access
to tubewells are drawn from a single family lineage. These
facts indicate that households at the head-end of the earthen
dam command area could cooperate among themselves to
monopolize water and deny farmers with plots located at the
tail-end their share of water from the dam. Other studies have
documented such examples of powerful families co-opting
the benefits of irrigation projects (see Bandopadhyay and
Eschen, 1988).
Conflicts arise primarily due to differences in priorities
of water users. For example, in Thadion differences in pri-
orities have been reflected in households belonging to a
single extended family that constitutes about 60% of all
water users using water from dams to irrigate rice during
the rabi season (Table 5). Farmers with access to tubewells
tend to view earthen dams as a supplemental source of
irrigation for rice cultivation.
4.3. Potential for irrigation service provision
Success with dam management in Bharauli is explained in
large part by the effectiveness of contractor-based water
provisioning. In Bharauli a water contractor has been in
charge of water distribution, collection of ISFs and routine
maintenance for three years (1997–2000). The ability of
the contractor to successfully bid for water distribution rights
at open auctions has been aided by surpluses he has derived
from irrigated agriculture. From a livelihood perspective,
the agricultural surplus that the contractor derives is critical
to ensuring well-being, especially since there was no other
male in the household earning income from non-farm em-
ployment.18 From the contractor’s point of view, sustaining
Table 3. Changes in household endowment scores between
1996 & 2000
HRMS Distribution in 1996 Distribution in 2000
Bharauli 61.4 69.1
Thadion 46.6 33.6
16 In the absence of alternative sources of irrigation in Bharauli the rela-
tionship between total land area under irrigation and that which benefits
from supply of water from the dam can be examined in a relatively straight
forward manner. To test the explanatory power of dam-assisted irrigation
we ran a regression using total land area irrigated (dependent variable)
and area irrigated by dam (independent variable). We found a robust
relationship between variables.
4. What do nature-based household endowment
and water interest scores tell us about
collective action?
In section 2 of the article we argued that our understand-
ing of collective may be enriched by combining an analysis
of process variables (such as those used in calculation of
endowment scores) with an examination of socio-economic
processes that reflect changes over time in process vari-
ables. In this section we turn to an analysis of the latter set
of issues: historically-defined relations of power and social
exchange, accumulation strategies of farmer households and
differentiation in terms of access to natural resources such
as land and water.
4.1. Access to irrigation from dams serves as a basis for
differentiation
Earlier on in the discussion we suggested that explanations
of collective action in irrigation may benefit from an ana-
lysis of process variables. Our examination of household
endowment scores based on two data sets from 1996 and
2000 reveals two interesting patterns (Table 3):
• Group heterogeneity in Bharauli is greater than in Thadion
at both points in time (1996 and 2000); and
• Bharauli appears to be becoming more heterogeneous
over time while Thadion is becoming more homogeneous.
A useful way to understand reasons behind such trends in
group heterogeneity is to examine each of the four vari-
ables that went into calculations of household endowment
scores. We examine the coefficient of variation of each of
the following variables: average land irrigated; average size
of rain-fed land owned; livestock composition; and average
family size. We observe that patterns of variance are com-
parable for all variables except for average irrigated land.
We therefore argue that the land area irrigated by the earthen
dam in Bharauli had the greatest explanatory power for
understanding trends captured in the movement of endow-
ment scores for both water user groups.16
17 Wade’s study of South Indian tank irrigation also concludes that re-
source scarcity can serve as a powerful incentive for organizing collective
action. But Bardhan points out that extreme resource scarcity may prove
detrimental to collective action since farmers may choose to abandon their
lands and migrate in search of better pastures (Bardhan, 1993).
18 Customarily, women in the Shiwalik region do not participate in non-
farm labour markets. This is primarily because of community norms that
prevent them from engaging in work in the presence of men.
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Table 4. Share of household income from farm and non-farm sources and level of interest in use of earthen dams
Endowment cluster Net farm based income Non-farm income Non-farm income as Cropping intensity Area irrigated
(mean) (mean) percentage of total  rate by earthen dam
household income (in acres)
(mean)
High 28,666 10,000 28.9 196 3
Medium 17,405 13,933 44.4 175.4 2.1
Low 13,381 17,158 60 185.7 1.2
19 From a methodological point view, it is important to note that analysis
of endowment distribution produces different outcomes depending on the
analytical method we adopt. For example, when we use land ownership as
a basis for analysis, distribution of household endowments appears rela-
tively more equal. However, when we adopt a method based on analysis
of nature based household endowments we get a picture of relatively
greater inequality in distribution of endowments within the group.
20 The relative heterogeneity of endowments is evident in a much higher
coefficient of variation of 20.4 in Bharauli compared to 2.9 in Thadion.
agricultural surplus is critically tied to ensuring compliance
with institutional rules that regulate use of the dam. Suc-
cess with ensuring rule compliance is influenced by three
factors:
• Alternative irrigation sources in the form of private
tubewells did not exist in Bharauli due to high drilling
costs. By contrast, approximately 53% of water users in
Thadion had access to private tubewells.
• The farm plots of the water contractor’s household were
located at the end of each of the three distributary chan-
nels. The water contractor had the largest acreage under
irrigation from the dam in Bharauli.
• Distribution of household endowments was relatively
more unequal in Bharauli compared to Thadion (Table 6).19
This was primarily because of the fact that, in the absence
of tubewell irrigation, not all plots received irrigation from
the dam. Greater heterogeneity in distribution of house-
hold endowments in Bharauli in the context of relative
homogeneity of interest in earthen dam management also
minimized the potential for factional conflicts among large
land holding households.20
Table 6. Distribution of household endowments: a comparison
HRMS Coefficient of variation Gini-coefficient
Bharauli 96 0.49
Thadion 64.2 0.35
Table 5. Rice cultivation: HRMS comparison
HRMS Percentage of water-using Mean gross cropped area
households growing rice under rice (in acres)
Bharauli 9 8.3
Thadion 46.6 30.9
The above discussion highlights the importance of a
specific set of socio-economic, ecological and political con-
ditions in facilitating contractor-based water provisioning.
First, strong leadership may result in economic interests
overriding caste-based differences and can facilitate col-
lective action in natural resources management. (see also
Vaidyanathan, 1986; Vedeld, 2000) Second, in a milieu
that discourages an extensive women’s role in the public
sphere, the number of males of working age in a household
may influence the potential for non-farm income diversi-
fication. This factor is highlighted in the decision of the
water contracting household to maximise gains from farm-
ing at the expense of non-farm employment. Third, specific
ecological conditions like location of arable plots of land in
relation to irrigation sources may critically influence an
individual’s decision to contract out water distribution rights.
The specific conditions of the contractor in the Bharauli
case contributed to the contractor-based water provisioning.
A different personality with weak leadership qualities and
with arable plots located at the head end of the irrigation
system may have led to a different set of outcomes with
regard to collective action. Further, the presence of an effect-
ive leader like the water contractor with arable plots located
at the tail end of the irrigation system may have changed
the fate of collective action in Thadion.
4.4. Compliance with irrigation service rules
The relatively greater access of the water contractor to arable
land and more specifically to irrigated land has accorded
him a powerful place in the village power structure. His-
torically the water contractor has been a source of credit
for landless households, especially in times of droughts
and floods. He has also been a source of employment for
marginal land-owning households. The contractor has played
an important role in regional politics by being leader of
Bharauli panchayat (local government) between 1995 and
2000. The contractor’s power within the village, together
with the fact that a substantial number of water users are
reliant on irrigated agriculture as a primary source of income,
has influenced level of compliance with water use rules. The
contractor has devised an intricate web of exchange rela-
tionships whereby payment of water fees is tied to services
like agricultural labour that marginal landowners owe to
the water contractor (see Bardhan, 1984: 61).
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relatively effective water distribution rules guaranteed a
relatively large number of households access to water
from the dam. In Thadion, by contrast, because a few house-
holds have a monopoly on use of water, the difference
between water requirement and water availability is greater.
The important point that emerges from this discussion is
that caste and endowment based heterogeneity (like the
case in Bharauli) need not necessarily prevent farmers from
cooperating to meet secular economic interests. On the other
hand caste and endowment based homogeneity in Thadion
masks a deep rooted process of social restructuring (driven
particularly but not exclusively by private tubewell pro-
liferation) that erodes potential for collective action in irri-
gation (Gupta, 2000).
Greater effectiveness of water distribution from the water-
harvesting dam is also reflected in the expansion of the
Bharauli distribution network. In response to growing profits
from water sales, the contractor expanded the distribution
network in 1999/2000 to provide irrigation to 15 additional
households. As a result, a total of 19.5 acres were brought
under irrigation. We must emphasize here that within the
constraints imposed by command area topography and avail-
ability of water in the dam, the dam contractor does attempt
to balance the needs of a wide constituency of water users.
The contractor attempts to supply farmers from other caste
groups and those with smaller land holdings as well. The
interests of large landholders who can wield enormous polit-
ical clout are accommodated in the expansion plan. Fur-
ther, 40% of the new beneficiaries were either his brothers
or belonged to his extended family. This suggests that the
contractor is playing a strategic leadership role by coordinat-
ing the interests of a group with a substantial stake in the
functioning of the irrigation system.
Household surveys in Bharauli revealed that 91% of dam
users received water for four to five months during the rabi
season (November to March) compared to only 28% of
water users in Thadion. Further, 89% of water-using house-
holds in Bharauli reported that supply of water from the
dam was predictable, compared to 83% of households in
Thadion. Therefore, one may argue that it is not the position
of the contractor in the village power hierarchy alone that
resulted in greater rule compliance in Bharauli. Contrary to
the mafia like image that such an interpretation may offer,
the contractor had leveraged his position in the village
power hierarchy to ensure that water distribution from the
dam met users expectations of a fair distribution. To quote
Fafchamps, ‘It is not so much private accumulation of wealth
that pre-industrial societies combat but the fact that some
Table 7. Water predictability difference
HRMS Water Water Difference
predictability predictability in water
among users among users predictability
at head end of at tail end of between head-
distribution distribution end and tail-
 network  network end users
Bharauli 1.8 1.3 0.5
Thadion 1.7 0.1 1.6
Moreover, the contractor has been able to dissuade mem-
bers of his extended family from bidding at water auctions
due to his predominant position in the power structure.
Finally, survey data indicate that most households relying
on non-farm incomes belong to low endowment category
and continue to be heavily reliant on cultivation of farm plots
to meet a substantial part of domestic food requirements.21
4.5. Water distribution rules
We adapted Ostrom’s use of ‘water availability difference’
to examine predictability in availability of water among
farmers at the head-end and tail-end of the dam distribution
network (Ostrom 1994: 552).22 The difference in predictab-
ility of water supply between head-end and tail-end farmers
was lower in Bharauli than in Thadion (Table 7). This
reflects the higher level of effectiveness of water distribu-
tion in Bharauli that is explained in large measure by greater
clarity about water use rules.
Another indication of the effectiveness of the water dis-
tribution system is the difference between average water
requirement and water availability. Based on rule of thumb
calculations of water requirements during the rabi season
and mean land sizes we arrived at the difference between
water requirements and water availability.23 In Bharauli,
21 We observe that low endowment category households derived the high-
est livestock based incomes when compared to medium and high category
households. Livestock based incomes were facilitated by access to fodder
from private fields under dam assisted irrigation. As a matter of fact low
endowment category households had access to the highest area under dam
assisted irrigation as a proportion of total land owned.
22 We allotted weights to qualitative assessments by farmers of how pre-
dictable their access to water from earthen dams was in Bharauli and
Thadion. By predictable we refer to how confident a farmer was that dam
water users with plots adjacent to his would release water to him for his
use. Accordingly, we allocated weights depending on whether a farmer’s
access to water was high (2), medium (1) or low (0).
23 During a period of normal rainfall three waterings are required for a
wheat crop. Four hours are required to water 1 acre of wheat crop from
the dam. Mean land size among water users in Bharauli is 4.7 acres.
Therefore, mean per-capita water requirement for wheat for water users in
Bharauli is 18.8 hours (4.7 × 4). But in 1999–2000 a total of 555 hours of
water was supplied in Bharauli at a mean per-capita rate of 16.1 hours. In
Thadion mean land size is 5.8 acres. Therefore, mean per-capita water
requirement for water users is 23.2 hours (5.8 × 4). But in 1999–2000 a
total of 479 hours of water was supplied in Thadion at a mean per capita
rate of 32 hours. This leads us to conclude: 1. that per-capita use of water
from the dam in Thadion was greater largely due to greater demand for
irrigation to compliment supply from private tubewells for paddy cultiva-
tion in the dry season and 2. That a larger number of farmers in Thadion
could potentially benefit from dam assisted irrigation for wheat cultivation
in the dry season if use of the dam for complimentary paddy irrigation
were curbed during the same period.
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a profit of Rs 7500. The same trend was repeated for 1999–
2000 but in Thadion a history of non-compliance with
water user charges resulted in reversion to HRMS water
provisioning. But as in previous years (1999–2000), water
provisioning by the HRMS failed to elicit compliance with
irrigation service rules.25 The repeated failure of the institu-
tional mechanism for managing the dam in Thadion led to
its siltation in 2001.
4.7. Participation in repair and maintenance of
earthen dams
We find that farmers in Bharauli readily cooperate with the
contractor in undertaking routine maintenance activities.
Between 1995 and 2000, the mean number of labour days
contributed towards maintenance of the distribution net-
work in Bharauli was 3.7, compared to 2.3 in Thadion.
Further, the mean monetary contribution towards maintain-
ing the distribution network was Rs 377, compared to Rs
Table 8. Compliance with water fees: comparison of HRMS groups
A: HRMS Bharauli
Head 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000
Lease amount committed by N/A (under N/A (under
contractor (in rupees) HRMS provision) HRMS provision) 3,000 2,500 5,000
Amount deposited in HRMS account Nil 3,000 2,500 5,000
Hourly user charge (in rupees) 25/hr 25/hr 25/hr 25/hr 25/hr
Profit from water leasing (i.e., difference
between lease amount and total dues N/A (under N/A (under
collected by contractor on hourly basis) HRMS provision) HRMS provision) no profit 7,500 5,000
B: HRMS Thadion
Head 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000
Lease amount committed by N/A (under
contractor (in rupees) N/A N/A 850 6,800 HRMS provision)
Amount deposited in HRMS account Nil Nil Nil 1,500 Zero compliance with
irrigation service fees
Hourly user charge (in rupees) N/A (no N/A (no
charges levied) charges levied) 10/hr 10/hr 10/hr
Profit from water leasing (i.e., difference
between lease amount and total dues
collected by contractor on hourly basis) N/A N/A Nil Nil N/A
of its members may accumulate while others are in need’
(1992: 153).
4.6. Collection of water fees
Greater compliance with rules regarding payment of water
fees is reflected in data on payment of water lease fee by
the contractor to the HRMS (Table 8). We observe that in
1995–96 the HRMS monitored water distribution from dams
in Bharauli and Thadion. In Bharauli water users complied
with payment of hourly water charges of Rs 20 while in
Thadion, where the hourly water charge was only Rs 10,
compliance was nil.24 In 1996–97 both dams were under
HRMS management and the trends with compliance with
user charges were similar. In 1997–98 both HRMS adopted
contractor-based water provisioning. In Bharauli the con-
tractor paid the lease amount of Rs 3000 to the HRMS
whereas in Thadion the contractor failed to do so. How-
ever, due to poor rains the contractor could not net a profit
from water sales in 1997.
In 1998–99 both water user groups adopted contractor-
based provisioning once more. In Bharauli the contractor
paid the lease amount to the HRMS while in Thadion three
individuals who combined to bid for the lease could only
pay only 22% of the lease amount owed to the HRMS.
That same year higher levels of compliance with payment
of water user fees enabled the contractor in Bharauli to net
24 It is important to point out here that a higher water charge in Bharauli
reflects a higher value placed on irrigation water. In that sense therefore, a
higher value for irrigation water may be viewed as a fundamental pro-
moter of collective action.
25 Two households with fields in the head end of the irrigation system
removed distribution pipes on the pretext of leveling their fields. Despite
repeated requests from households with fields in the tail end of the system
the pipes were never replaced. One of the large landholders offered to
circumvent the problem by installing a siphoning system. But his uncle,
another large landholder refuted the idea of siphoning as it would silt up
the dam. He instead offered to desilt the dam and charge water users for
water use to recover his investment. However, he did not carry out desilting
work but continued to charge users for water use. His nephew objected to
this practice and began a parallel scheme of siphoning water and distribut-
ing it to farmers and insisting that his uncle should keep his promise of
undertaking de-silting work on the dam. Continuing conflict between these
two households resulted in the dam falling into disrepair in March 2001.
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156 in Thadion. We also observe, through regression ana-
lysis, that large landholding households made the largest
monetary contributions towards maintenance of the distri-
bution network; farmers with smaller areas irrigated by the
dam made more labour contributions towards maintenance
activities.
5. Conclusions
The central argument of this article is that, contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, heterogeneity of nature-based endow-
ments, such as arable land, proportionate to household size
may facilitate collective action in irrigation management.
Collective action in irrigation management may take the
form of service provision by an individual entrepreneur
and concerted action by a group of resource users to com-
ply with rules regulating use of a common pool system.
But for heterogeneity to facilitate collective action, certain
minimum conditions must be met. First, local ecological
conditions must ensure a favourable benefit stream to a
critical number of resource users. Our case study evidence
highlights the fact that in the absence of alternative tube-
well irrigation in Bharauli, water users placed a higher eco-
nomic value on irrigation from the dam when compared
to Thadion.
Our case study evidence also highlights the role of
historically defined power and social exchange relations in
facilitating collective action under conditions of relative
heterogeneity of endowments. These include: the importance
of caste and hierarchy in the village social order; gender
and exclusion of women from access to non-farm employ-
ment; tying credit to mobilization of labour for repair of
the dam and compliance with payment of irrigation service
fees; and intra family rules that forbid competition in
bidding for purchase of water distribution rights. Further,
we also highlight the fact that land ownership per se does
not ensure political power. Family size critically determined
the extent of surplus that could be sold in external markets
and influenced a person’s standing in the community.
Our endowment score calculation indicates the absence of
factional conflicts in Bharauli. The absence of factional
conflicts is seen to be an important motivating factor for
the contractor to provide irrigation services in Bharauli.
From a policy perspective we emphasize three points
made by Poteete and Ostrom with regard to the discussion
on the influence of group heterogeneity on collective action
(Poteete and Ostrom, 2003: 22). First, public officials
(including NGO field workers) should not presume a deter-
minate relationship between heterogeneity and the level of
collective action. Second, there is no blueprint to elicit com-
munity participation in natural resource management. Given
the wide variety of characteristics that groups possess as
well as the diversity of ecological conditions they face, rules
that work well to facilitate collective action for one group
may or may not work well when used by others. Third, the
design of institutions that help a group to distribute the
benefits and costs of participation is more important than
the particular attributes of the group itself.
From a methodological point of view this article adopted
a three step approach to analysis of collective action in
irrigation management. First, the article outlined the key
features of the joint management contract that embodied
elements of participatory irrigation management. Second,
the article examined the process by which several of those
policy guidelines were implemented by state parastatals such
as the forest and irrigation departments. The lack of trans-
parency and accountability in procedures of government
agencies was evident from our post-project analysis of
earthen dam management in the Haryana Shiwaliks. Only
eight of the 45 dams that were constructed were function-
ing when data for this study were collected (see Table 1).
The final step adopted by the study was to examine collect-
ive action in eight HRMS with functioning dams. In this
context, we found that watershed groups that were relatively
heterogeneous in distribution of nature-based endowments
facilitated provision of water from earthen dams by the con-
tractor. We also found — although this is not statistically
proven, due to the small sample size — that contractor-
based water provisioning tended to ensure greater success
of compliance with irrigation service rules such as pay-
ment of user fees, conflict-free water distribution and
routine repairs of dams. This was in contrast to relatively
more homogeneous watershed groups where compliance
with irrigation service rules was not as successful.
The construction of household endowment and water
interest scores was undertaken with a view to understand the
conditions that made contractor-based water provisioning a
relative success. We justified the use of household endow-
ment scores to overcome the over reliance on caste or land
ownership as indicators of group heterogeneity. We argued
instead for an approach that combined analysis of pro-
cess variables (such as rainfed and irrigated land and live-
stock composition proportionate to household size) with an
analysis of socio-economic processes that reflect change
over time in process variables. Socio-economic processes
we pointed out may include historically defined power and
social exchange relations, accumulation strategies of far-
mers and differentiation in access to natural resources. In
the course of applying nature based water interest scores,
we found that increasing reliance on non-farm income need
not necessarily pose a threat to collective action in man-
agement of a common pool irrigation system. Further, in
the course of applying nature-based household endowment
scores we emphasized the importance of specifying what
constitutes collective action. A clear specification of what
constitutes collective action could enable the use of house-
hold endowment and water interest scores to predict conflicts
and indicate potential for service provision and compliance
with irrigation service rules.
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Appendix 1
Variables
In the process of constructing household endowment scores
we considered four variables: (i) total rainfed land owned,
(ii) total irrigated land owned, (iii) type of livestock owned
and (iv) size of household. Total irrigated land owned
refers to land irrigated by tubewells, earthen dams and kuhls
(seasonal water channels). The principal livestock types
considered in constructing the endowment scores are adult
cows, buffaloes, bullocks, goats and camels. Household size
refers to total number of members in a household.
Weights
In constructing household endowment scores we devised
weights for each of the assets outlined above. The weights
were decided based on food productivity assessments under-
taken in Shiwalik villages. Four criteria guided the alloca-
tion of weights for variables:
• per-acre productivity of corn/rice and wheat under non-
irrigated conditions
• per-acre productivity of corn/rice and wheat under irrig-
ated conditions
• average milk production by buffaloes in summer,
monsoon and winter months
• average milk production by cows in summer, monsoon
and winter months
Assumptions
In devising weights for caloric value of cereal crops and
average milk production we made five assumptions:
• Each adult requires a minimum of 2,300 kilocalories (kcal)
per day.
• The annual average kcal requirement for an individual
would therefore be some 850,000 kcal.
• A kg of a cereal like corn, wheat or rice contains on
average 3,500 kcal.
• Cow’s milk contains 700 kcal per litre.
• Buffalo milk contains 900 kcal per litre.
Cereal crops caloric equivalent
Household-level assessments of crop and milk production
were undertaken for which the following measures based
on production under irrigated and non-irrigated conditions
were used:
• One acre of rice or corn in kharif (monsoon) season
under non-irrigated conditions yields 1,200 kgs per acre
on average.
• One acre of wheat in rabi (winter) season under non-
irrigated conditions yields 500 kgs per acre.
• Therefore, under non-irrigated conditions annual average
yields per acre are approximately 1,700 kgs (i.e. 1,200 +
500).
• A yield of 1,700 kgs per acre under non-irrigated condi-
tions is equivalent to some six million kcal per year (i.e.
1,700 * 3,500).
• Following from our earlier assumption regarding a min-
imum calorie requirement per individual of 850,000 kcal
per year, six million kcal would sustain seven members
of a family.
• Under irrigated conditions one acre of corn in kharif
season yields 1,800 kgs per acre.
• Under irrigated conditions one acre of wheat in rabi
season yields 1,600 kgs per acre.
• Therefore, under irrigated conditions total yield per acre
is approximately 3,400 kgs (i.e. 1,800 + 1,600).
• A yield of 3,400 kgs per acre under irrigated conditions
yields a caloric equivalent of 11,900,000 kcal per year
(i.e. 3,500 * 3,400).
• Assuming a minimum annual calorie requirement of
850,000 per individual, 11,900,000 kcal would sustain
14 members of a family.
Milk production and calorie equivalent
Milk production in Shiwalik villages varies by season. In
the summer months between March and May an adult buf-
falo produces about 5 litres of milk per day. During the
monsoon period between June and October, milk produc-
tion peaks at about 10 litres per day. In the winter, between
November and February, average milk production per day
is about 4 litres. However, as no milk is produced for a few
weeks in a year we assume that average annual milk pro-
duction is approximately 2,000 litres. Two thousand litres
of milk produced by an adult buffalo translates into a caloric
equivalent of 1.8 million kcal annually; thus the 1.8 million
kcal contained in buffalo milk can sustain 2.5 persons
annually.
On the other hand during the monsoon season, a cow
produces some 750 litres of milk. During the summer season,
milk production falls to approximately 450 litres. There-
fore, total annual milk production by a cow would be in the
range of 1,200 litres. This 1,200 litres of cows milk translates
into a caloric equivalent of 840,000 kcal. This 840,000 kcal
contained in cows milk could sustain one family member
annually.
Based on average food productivity assessments for cereal
crops and milk we calculated household endowment scores
as follows:
(7Lr + 14Li + 2.5B + 1C + 0.5C + 0.1G )/H.H. Size
where Lr = acres of rainfed land, Li = acres of irrigated
land, B = no. of adult buffaloes, C = no. of adult cows, Ca
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= no. of camels, G = no. of goats, H.H. Size = no. of
members in a household.
If the household score equals one it means that the house-
hold can just feed its members with grown food and home
produced milk assuming all land is used for food produc-
tion and half of all adult animals are milk producing.26
26 For a related discussion on caloric terms of trade (see Dietz et al., 2001).
Household water interest score calculation
Area irrigated by dam Score
a) Less than 1 acre : 1
b) Between 1 and 3 acres : 2
c) Between 3 and 5 acres : 4
d) Greater than 5 acres : 8
Alternative sources of irrigation for
dam-irrigated land Score
a) Tubewell 1
b) Tal Kuhl/Tal Nadi 2
c) None : 4
:
:
Land irrigated outside dam command area Score
a) Greater than 3 acres 1
b) Between 2 and 3 acres : 2
c) Between 1 and 2 acres : 4
d) Between 0.5 and 1 acre : 8
e) None : 16
Parameters for calculation of interest scores
Parameter Non-irrigated Irrigated land Increase by
land factor of
Food (wheat) 500 kg/acre 1,000 kg/acre 2
Wheat from 1 acre
can feed 7 People 14 People 2
Fodder grass can
sustain 2.5 people if milk 5 people if milk
is consumed is consumed 2
